INSURANCE COMPANY vs. DUFFIELD.

RECENT-AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Superior Court of Cincinnati.-GeneralTerm, June, 1855.
THE MERCHANTS' AND MANUFACTURERS'

INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL,

vs. CHARLES DUFFIELD ET AL. 1
1. The legal meaning of the term abandonment, as used in a policy of insurance, is
a transfer to the underwriter of the interest of the assured to the extent that
interest is covered by the policy.
2. A policy of insurance contained the following clause: "And in all cases of abandonment, the assured shall assign, transfer, and set over to said insurance company, all their interest in and to the said steamboat, and every part, free of all
claims and charges whatever.' The steamboat was assured only as to threefourths of its value-was wrecked and abandoned to the insurance offices. Held,
that the abandonment spoken of in the clause, and noted from the policy, could
only be an abandonment in the legal technical sense.of the word, and the owner
had an interest of one-fourth in the boat after abandonment, as to which they
-were their own insurers.

An insurance was effected on the steamboat Sam Cloon, in four
insurance companies; the agreed value of the boat being $20,000,
and the amount insured in each office $3,750, or in all $15,000.
The policy in each case was in the same form and with the same
conditions.
The steamboat having been sunk in the Mississippi river, was
by a writing executed for the purpose abandoned to the insurance
companies, who by means of persons acting for them raised the
boat, and realized from the wreck, after deducting charges and expenses, the sum of three thousand dollars. The present action was
brought by the owners, who effected the insurance, to recover onefourth of that sum, claiming that they all retained, after the abandonment, an interest of one-fourth in the wreck. This claim was
resisted by the insurance companies, on the ground, that by the
2 Handy's Superior Court Rep. 122. We again take occasion to express our
thanks to the Reporters of this volume for the early sheets.
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terms and conditions of the policies, the owners were required to
abandon not only to the extent of the interest insured, but all interest in the subject matter insured. The part of the policies supposed to bear on this question was as follows: "And in case of loss
or misfortune, as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the assured, their
agents or assigns, to use every reasonable effort for the safeguard
and recovery of the said steamboat, and every part thereof, and if
recovered, to cause the same to be forthwith repaired, if practicable; and in case of neglect or refusal on the part of the insured,
their agents or assigns, to adopt prompt and sufficient measures for
the safeguard and recovery thereof, then said insurers are hereby
authorized, and shall have the election to interpose and recover said
steamboat, and cause the same to be repaired for account of the
assured, to the charges of which the said insurance company will
contribute in proportion as the sum herein insured bears to the
agreed value in this policy, or to consider such neglect or refusal as
an abandonment, and be entitled to recover said steamboat, or any
part thereof, at their own expense, and for their own use and benefit; and in no case whatever shall the assured have the right to
abandon, until it shall be ascertained that the recovery and repairs
of said steamboat are impracticable; nor sell the wreck, or any
part thereof, without the consent of this company; and in all cases
of abandonment the assured shall assign, transfer, and set over to
said insurance company, all their interest in and to the said steamboat, and every Tart thereof,free of all claims and charges whatever."
On the submission of the action to be tried by the court at special term, a judgment was rendered in favor of the insured for
one-fourth of the sum realized from the wreck. To reverse this
judgment, a petition in error was filed by the insurance companies.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GHOLSON, J.-The principle and foundation of all insurance is
indemnity. The contract of insurance cannot be made a cover for
gambling. It was at one time supposed in England, that valued
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policies as they are called, were invalid, as falling under the prohibition against wager policies. But they were sustained as an estimate, by agreement of the parties, of the value of the subject
matter of insurance. In the absence of fraud, in case of a total
loss, the estimate of value so made must stand, but an average
loss opens the policy. Slawe vs. Felton, 2 East, 109; 7 Mass. 869;
7 Ohio, 1, pt. 284.
In an open policy, if a loss happen, the value of the subject matter of insurance is fixed by reference to the time of the insurance,
as in case of a vessel, at the time of the commencement of the
voyage. And the only difference seems to be, that what in one
case would be matter of proof, is in the other matter of agreement.
2 East, 109, 117; 7 Mass. 369.
Now, an insurance may be to the extent of .afull indemnity, or
for a partial indemnity; and to the extent that there is no indemnity, the owner of the subject matter of insurance has been said to
be his own insurer.
So an indemnity to a certain extent may be obtained by a contract with A.; to a certain other extent with B., and so on ; and
still these several contracts may not provide for a full indemnity;
to a certain extent the owner may be uninsured.
In an ordinary case where there is a partial loss, there takes
place what is termed an adjustment; "and the rate of the loss
being ascertained, the insurer is liable in the proportion which the
sum insured bears to the actual value of the property included in
the risk described in the policy." 7 Mass. 374; 2 J. 0. 36. The
effect of this rule is, as has been stated, to make the owner of the
property insured contribute to his own loss in proportion as any
part of its value may be uninsured. To secure a full indemnity, he
must insure to the full value of the property. This rule of contribution does not apply under a policy against fire. 6 Pick. 186.
Where there has been in fact a partial loss, but the insured has
made an abandonment to several insurers, and has been paid the
amount of the indemnity for which he contracted, the same not extending to the whole value of the subject matter insured, is the
adjustment made on the same principle ? Is the owner considered
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in this case, as in the other, in the light of an insurer ? or does he
renounce this right by the abandonment?
It is expressly stated in the elementary books, " that the abandonment cannot transfer the interest of the assured any further
than that interest is covered by the policy." Arnould, 1159. This
is in accordance with the rule laid down in 5 Peters, 622.
Indeed, the general proposition on this subject was not controverted in the argument, but the right of the assured to contribution in the case stated was admitted; at least it was admitted that
such was the doctrine in all the recent elementary works on insurance."
Admitting that after an abandonment to insurers, the amount of
whose policies does not cover the value of the subject matter insured, the owner would be entitled to his proportion of what might
e saved, it is claimed that this right is cut off by a clause in theAlthough the general doctrine was not controverted in this case, yet in &case
probably on a policy similar to the one on which the present controversy arose, the
court in Kentucky appears to have arrived at a different conclusion, and to have
placed its decision on the ground that the general doctrine was different from
that admitted in this case, as having been laid down in the elementary books.
In the case of Cincinnati Insurance Company vs. Bakewell, 4 B. Monroe, 541, 54.
it is said:
The claim of Farrow to a rateable interest in the net proceeds of the.sale, proportioned to the uninsured part of the boaVs agreed value in the policies, as it could only
be made in that shape, on the ground that the abandonment was effectual, so, it is,
in our opinion, precluded by the same fact, upon the ,principle that an abandonment, legally made, puts the underwriters completely in the place of the assured,
and operates in effect a transfer of property; Chesapeake Insurance Company vs.
Stark, 6 Cranch, 272; Col. Insurance Company ve. Ashby, &c., 4 Peters' S. C. Rep.
144, &c., &c. And on this principle, with regard to which we have seen no contrariety of opinion or authority, the claim was rejected by the Chancellor. We may
add, without deciding that such a claim would not, under any circumstances, be
admissible, that as it is optional with the insured, even when he has the undoubted
right of abandonment, either to retain the property and seek his indemnity in what
may be saved by himself, and in his remedy, if he has one, for a partial loss, or by
abandoning the property to secure a recovery for a total loss, leaving to the underwriter the chance of indemnity by saving what he can, at his own risk and expense,
there is at least no equity in allowing the insured, after such abandonment, to
come in for any share of what may be saved, while the underwriter is not indemnified."
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policies in this case. Indeed, that is the only question made by
the counsel for the parties in their argument, and we have referred
to the principles before adverted to, only for the proper understanding of that question, and in aid of a true construction of the policies, on which a correct decision must depend.
The legal effect of an abandonment-the meaning of that term is
now well understood by all who are conversant in matters of
insurance. When, therefore, we find the term used in a policy of
insurance, we are bound to suppose that the parties have used it in
its legal sense. In that sense, it certainly does not mean simply an
abandonment of the vessel; for an abandonment may be effectually
made by an insured, who at the same time retains possession of the
vessel, or goods abandoned, and sells or disposes of the same.
Indeed, it is his duty to do so, unless the abandonment be accepted.
And we need not say, that an abandonment may be effectual without
any acceptance. So a vessel, when in a position which might well
justify an abandonment, in its technical sense, as understood in the
law of insurance, may be ever so completely abandoned in a literary
sense; and yet such an act has nothing to do, and is in no manner
connected, with an abandonment in a technical sense.
An abandonment, as that term is understood when applied to
contracts of insurance, means the yielding up or surrendering to the
insurer by the insured of the interest in the property covered by
the insurance. It is usually done by the owner of the property
when informed of the peril or loss. He gives to the insurer notice
of an abandonment. The effect of an abandonment is to place the
insurer, in reference to the interest covered by the policy, in the
place of the insured. Some of the expressions used on this subject
in the books, are very strong, and might well lead to the idea that
the abandonment extended to the whole interest owned, and not
merely that insured. 4 B. Monroe, 544.
When an insurer elects to claim a total loss, as he may in some
cases where it is not so in fact, "as the thing insured, or a portion
of it still exists, and is vested in him, the very principle of the
indemnity requires that he should make a cession of all his right to
the recovery of it, and that, too, within a reasonable time after he
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receives intelligence of the accident, that the underwriter may be
entitled to all the benefit of what may still be of any value; and
that he may, if he pleases, take measures, at his own cost, for
realizing or increasing that value." Rouz vs. ,Salvador, 3 Bingh.
N. C. 266; 32 E. C. L.110-120.
"The abandonment, where properly made, operates as a transfer
of the property to the underwritery and gives him a title to it, or
what remains of it, as far as it was covered by the policy." Patapsco Ins, 0. vs. Southgate, 5 Pet. 604, 622.
With this understanding of the legal meaning of the term
"abandoment," -we proceed to examine the clause in the policies
which are claimed to extend the effect and operation of an abandonment beyond the limit before established by law. The clause taken
singly is as follows - "In all cases of abandonment, the assured
shall assign, transfer, and set over to said Insurance Company all
their interest in and to the said steamboat, and every part thereof,
free of all claims and charges whatever." Was it the intention, by
the introduction into the policy, of this clause, to give to an abandonment an effect by agreement which it did not have by law?
In the case just cited from 5 Peters, it is said: 1 There is some
diversity of opinion 'among the elementary writers, and in the
adjudged cases, as to what will constitute a valid abandonment. It
seems, however, agreed that no particular form isnecessary, nor is
it indispensable that it should be in writing. But in whatever mode
or form it is made, it ought to be explicit, and not left open as
matter of inference from some equivocal acts. The assured must
yield up to the underwriter all hig right, title and interest in the
subject insured." In view of the remarks in the extract just quoted,
it does not seem improbable that the framer of the policies under
consideration, which for the most part, and especially as to the
clause under consideration, are printed forms for general use, may
have intended to guard against the difficulty of considering any
doubtful or equivocal acts an abandonment, by a requisition that
there should be a direct transfer and assignment of the interest,
which should properly be yielded up or ceded by the insured to the
insurer on claiming a total loss. And the clause may also have
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been intended to insure a transfer or assignment of the interest free
from the claims or charges of other persons.
If the term "abandonment" in the first part of the clause was
used in its legal signification, as understood in the law of insurance,
then, as before stated, it means a cession of the interest covered by
the policy; and to say that in all cases of such a cession there shall
be a transfer or assignment of all interest in the subject matter
insured, free of all claims and charges whatever, can only properly
refer to the form or mode in which the cession is to be effectuated,
and not to its extent, that being fully shown by the use of the term
"abandonment."
If the construction claimed for the plaintiffs in
error be correct, then the term "abandonment" cannot have been
used in its proper legal sense, and the clause should have read: "in
all cases of a claim for a total loss the assured shall assign, transfer,
and set over (i. e. abandon, cede, by assignment or transfer) all
their interest," &c. The abandonment or cession is consequent
upon the claim for a total loss and necessary to make that claim
effectual, as explained in the case of Rouz vs. Salvador, before
cited. It may be, if the intent otherwise required, that we would
be justified in giving to the term " abandonment" the sense just
indicated; but, as the latter part of the clause may have a proper
meaning, without extending the operation and effect of an abandonment beyond that ascribed to it by law, and the other conditions
and clauses of the policy do not require, but rather forbid such a
construction, and it would in our judgment be attended, in several
respects, with inconvenient results, we do not feel that it is a proper
case for inferring that words were used in other than their proper
legal sense.
It is not reasonable to suppose that the framer of the policies,
had he intended so important a change in the operation and effect
of an abandonment, as to make it i milude not only the interest
covered by the policy, but all the interest of the insured in the
subject matter of insurance, would have left that intention a matter
of doubtful inference, or would have failed to express it in clear and
apt language. A change of this description in policies of insurance
should be unambiguous. It might in very many cases preclude the
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insured from claiming a total loss, and would almost invariably
create a difficulty where insurances had been effected in different
offices, and they were unwilling to act together, for the insured
could only abandon to one, and as that might be considered a sale or
disposition of the wreck, which is prohibited by the policy, it might
be doubtful whether he could recover from the others, even for a
partial loss. But it is not necessary to enter more minutely into
the inconveniences which might result from such a construction, as
we are satisfied that upon the language used, the construction given
by the Court at Special Term, resulting in a recovery by the insured,
may be maintained. The judgment will, therefore, be affirmed.
Bates &. Scarborough, 'offin & Mitchell, for plaintiffs in error.
Nizon, for defendants.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,1854--In -Equity.
THE WESTERN SAVING FUND SOCIETY OF PHILADELPHIA ET AL. VS. THE
CITY OF PHILADELPHIBA ET AL.'
1. By the original ordinance for the construetlon and management of the gas works
of the old city of Philadelphia, the city was authorized, if it should deem expedient,
to take possession of the works, and to convert the stock thereby created into a
redeemable loan. The works in the meantime were to be controlled and managed in all respects by a board of trustees appointed by the City Councils. Ad.
ditional stock was created by subsequent ordinances, with the same reservation of
right to the city. In June, 1841, the city exercised this right, and certificates of
loan were issued to the former stockholders. On June 14, 1841, an ordinance
was passed authorizing a further loan for the extension of the works, by which the
works were pledged for the payment of principal and interest of "all loans made
for or on account of said gas works ;" the faith of the city was pledged that the
price of gas should not be reduced so as to reduce the clear profits below 8 per
cent. a year; and it was expressly stipulated that the gas works and the funds
thereof should be wholly controlled and managed by a board of trustees elected
' The following case, like several other important decisions of the last few years,
has been omitted, from some incomprehensible reason, from the reports of the period. We regret that our space will not permit us to publish it in as complete a

form as we could desire.
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and constituted as theretofore, and who were to pay no part of the said funds into
the City Treasury, until all the principal and interest of saidloans should be fully
paid. Loans were taken under the provisions of subsequent ordinances. In 1854,
after the passage of the Act to consolidate the city of Philadelphia, which provided for the creation of a department of gas, an ordinance was introduced and
passed by the Common Council of the new city, which in effect took the whole
control and management of the gas works and their funds from the trustees, and
placed it in the hands of an officer to be styled Chief Engineer of the Gas Works,
who was to be at the head of that department. In consequence of this action, the
loanholders filed a bill to prevent the city from intermeddling or interfering with
the trustees, or from attempting to invalidate the trust. Held, that the ordinance
of 1841 created a contract between the city and the loanholders, present and
future, which it was incompetent to invalidate, either by removing the property of
the works from the trustees, or by altering the price of gas so as to lower the profits of the works below eight per cent.
2. A city, in the supply of gas to its citizens, acts as a private corporation, and is
subject to the same duties, liabilities, and disabilities. It cannot impair the
obligation of a contract entered into by it in that capacity, because it may deem
it for the benefit of its citizens so to do.

Bill for an injunction and other relief.
The Common Council of the consolidated city of Philadelphia, on
the 29th August, 1854, passed an ordinance in relation to the Philadelphia Gas Works, the provisions of which, material to the present case, are as follows:
SEc. 1. The Select and Common Councils of the city of Philadelphia do ordain, That the Select and Common Councils shall, on
the passage hereof, and annually thereafter in the month of September, and whenever a vacancy shall occur by death, resignation
or otherwise, elect by viva voce vote, in joint meeting, a Chief Engineer of Gas Works. He shall hold his office until his successor be
chosen at the annual time fixed therefor, unless sooner removed by
a resolution of Councils.
SEc. 3. He shall be the head of the department of the Gas
Works. As such he shall take charge of the works and machinery
owned by the said corporation and used for the manufacture and
distribution of gas ; and superintend all matters pertaining to their
construction, repair and management, and to the manufacture and
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distribution of gas. He shall employ all labor necessary for such
management, and purchase or contract for the supply of materials
to be used in the construction and repair of the works and the
manufacture and distribution of gas. But no contract or engagement
for labor or materials, or any extension or enlargement of the works, or
their appurtenances, shall be made unless authorized by Councils, and
an appropriation made therefor; and no contract or engagement shall
be entered into until the same be submitted to the Committee on
the Gas Works, for inspection. He shall be charged with the collection of the gas rents, and all claims for the sale of the products
I
of the gas works.
SEC. 4. He shall define and regulate the duties of all the officers
of this department, but in such manner as not to interfere with any
duties herein imposed upon any such officer; and cause such accounts to be kept as shall exhibit the financial condition of the department.
SEc. 8. All moneys due for the sales of gas and the other products of the works, shall be collected by such officers of the department as the Chief Engineer may designate, and such places as he
may appoint, under his control and as his agents ; the amounts so
collected shall be reported daily by the Chief Engineer, agent or
agents, under oatlh or affirmation, upon his responsibility, to the City
Controller, and immediately after such report he shall pay the same
to the City Treasurer.
SEc. 13. All ordinances of the corporation of the Mayor, Aldermen and Citizens of Philadelphia, which provide for the management of the Philadelphia Gas Works, and are inconsistent herewith
or are supplied hereby, be and the same are hereby repealed.
The gas works had been previously owned by the city, but placed
under the control and management of trustees, by ordinance, and
under circumstances sufficiently set forth and detailed in the opinion
below. They were also pledged for a number of successive loans,
amounting together to a large sum. One of the objects of thee proposed ordinance of 1854, was supposed to be to procure a reduction
in the price of gas. Several of the loanholders, apprehensive of the

SAVING FUND vs. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA.

security of their investments, united with the trustees in a bill to
restrain the action of the city.
Gerhardand HereditI, for complainants.
Hazlehurst, for the city.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LEWIs, C. J.-This is a motion for a special injunction to restrain
"the City of Philadelphia" from interfering or intermeddling with
the trustees of the Philadelphia Gas Works, and from any attempt to
invalidate the trust, or the security in the hands of the said trustees
for the holders of the loans made for the construction and extension of
the works, or to seize'or take possession of the works, revenues or profits." The works were originally constructed by means of funds
raised by subscriptions to stock made by private individuals in pursuance of an ordinance passed on the 21st March, 1835. By the
terms of that ordinance the works were the private property of the
stockholders, and their only source of re-embursement was the
profits. The city Was not liable for anything beyond the application of the money paid into the city treasury by the stockholders.
By that ordinance, which formed the contract between the city and
the stockholders, the works were to be under the management of
twelve trustees, to be chosen by the Select and Common Councils.
The terms of office of the trustees were so arranged that one-third
of their number would go out every year, and their places were to
be supplied by the annual election of two trustees by the Select,
and the same number by the Common Council. By the same ordinance the city had the right, if at any time the Select and Common
Councils might deem it expedient, to take possession of the works
and convert the stock into a loan, redeemable in twenty years from
the date of conversion, bearing an interest of six per cent. per annum, payable-half yearly on the first days of February and August.
Under this arrangement, the money was raised, the trustees were
appointed, and the works constructed. By subsequent ordinances,
assented to by the stockholders, the works were from time to time
extended, and loans made for the purpose of defraying the charges.
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But on the 14th January, 1841, an ordinance was passed containing many provisions so beneficial to the city, and, at the same time
so disadvantageous to the stockholders, that there was good reason
to apprehend that the latter would not consent to them. To meet
that contingency it was provided in the ordinance that if the stockholders did not consent to the terms proposed before the 25th of
February, 1841, the mayor, aldermen and citizens of Philadelphia
should, on the 1st of March, 1841, take possession of the works in
their own right, and the stock should be converted into a loan in
the manner provided by the original ordinance of associationthe works to remain under the direction of and superintendence of the
trustees, until otherwise provided for. The ordinance of the 14th
January, 1841; was not accepted; and the city, in pursuance of an
ordinance of the 3d June, 1841, issued certificates of loan to the
several stockholders. This ordinance contained a section by which
the trustees were required to set apart and reserve, out of the
moneys received by them from the manufacture and sale of gas,
eight per cent. per annum on the amount of the loan thus authorized to be applied, in the first place, to the payment of the interest
accruing thereon, and thb balance to the sinking fund. This brings
us to the Ordinance of the 17th June, 1841. By that ordinance a
further loan of $125000 was authorized for the purpose of extending the works. The city was to borrow the money in such sums as
might be required by the trustees. The certificates of loan were
to be transferable at the office of the Philadelphia Gas Works.
The rate of interest was to be fixed by the trustees. It was to be
payable semi-annually at the Gas Works. The faith of the city,
the sinking fund and the buildings, apparatus, pipes, fixtures, and
the income and profits of the said gas works, were expressly pledged
for the punctual payment of the interest, and for the ultimate
reimbursement of the principal of all the loans made for or on
account of said gas works, as the same shall become due; and, in
order that provision may be made for the same, the said trustees
were authorized and required to set apart all the clear net profits that
may remain after paying the interest on the said several loans, to
constitute a sinking fund, which, with the interest thereon, was to.
43
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be invested in loans, and kept separate from the other funds of the
said works. And "for the further security of the loanholders of
said works, the faith of the city was expressly pledged, that the
price of gas should not at any time be reduced so as to reduce the
clear profits below eight per cent per annum on the whole amount of
the cost of said works until all the loans contracted for, or that may
hereafter be contracted for, shall be paid." And for the further
security of the said loan holders, It was expressly "stipulated that
the works shall be controlled and managed by a board of trustees
elected and constituted as heretofore, who shall have the whole
control and management of the said works and of the said sinking
fund, and--of all the other funds belonging to the said works, and
the said trustees shall pay no part of said funds, nor any part of
the profit of said works into the city treasury, but shall apply and
appropriate the same as is directed by this ordinance, until the
interest and principal of the said loans shall be fully paid as they
become due to the said loauholders." In pursuance of this ordinance, and of the faith of the pledges contained in it, the sum of
$125,000 was obtained on certificates issued by the city, in each of
which it was particularly set forth that it was "issued in pursuance
,of an ordinance of the 17th June, 1841." This made the provisions of that ordinance, so far as they related to the rights of the
parties, as much a part of the contract as if they had been set forth
at length in each certificate of loan. But the pledges in regard to
the price of gas were made expressly "for the further security" of
all the loans contracted or that might thereafter be contracted.
And the stipulations in regard to the control of the works, and the
duty of the trustees to appropriate the profits of them, were also
expressly made for the same loanholders.
In none of the ordinances subsequently passed,is there
any provision for the repeal of any part of the ordinance of the 17th June,
1841, or any attempt made to place the new loans upon a footing
different from those previously made under that ordinance. On the
contrary the certificates to be issued from time to time were, in each
ordinance authorizing them, directed to be in like form and transfera-Ue in like manner with the certificates of the other loans authorized
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for the purpose of said gas works ;" and in each ordinance authorizing
a new loan, the trustees were directed to set apart out of the profits of
the works, ten per cent. per annum on the amount borrowed, for the
purpose of paying the interest thereon and for reimbursing the
principal, &c. "A subsequent statute is never to be construed to
repeal a prior one, unless there be a contrariety in them, or at least
some notice taken of the former act, so as to indicate an intention
to repeal it." "The law does not favor a repeal by implication,
unless the repugnance be quite plain." Dwarris on Statutes, 674.
" To repeal an express enactment by implication requires a strong
and clear inconsistency." Street vs. The Commonwealth, 6 W.
& S. 212. We see no such inconsistency, nor. any evidence of an
intention to repeal the stipulations in favor of all subsequent loanholders for the extension of the gas works. Such a repeal would
have been an act of injustice and bad faith to the original stockholders, whose money had constructed the works, and who had
accepted certificates of loan in pursuance of the ordinance of the
3d of June, 1841, which contained a provision that ten per cent.
per annum on the amount of that loan should be set apart for the
purpose of paying it out of the moneys received from the manufacture and sale of gas.
The repeal would likewise be an act of gross impolicy on the part
of the city, because the only effect of it would have been to leave
the works under a mortgage for the loans already contracted, in
pursuance of the ordinance of 17th June, 1841, while a question
seriously affecting the credit of the loans would have arisen, respecting the power of the city to pledge them as a security, on which
further loans for the extension of the works might be raised. The
ordinance of 17th June, 1841, was, therefore, very judiciously permitted to remain in full force when the various subsequent loans
were made. It designated the security which was pledged, and
prescribed the remedy for making that security available. It placed
the pledged property and funds in the hands of trustees, to be
selected in such a manner as to secure the confidence of capitalists
who advanced their money. It is a rule in the construction of contracts, that the law existing when a contract is made enters into it,
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and necessarily forms a part of it. The remedies prescribed for enforcing performance, are regarded by the parties as constituting
that "obligation" of the contract, which is within the protection
of the constitution. If the remedies were taken away, there would
be nothing but the moral obligation left, and it is absurd to suppose that this was the "obligation of the contract," which the legislature was prohibited from impairing. Plain common sense, responding to the demands of justice, has scattered to the winds the
flimsy distinction between the right and the remedy, so far as to declare that any change of the nature or extent of the latter so as to
impair the former, is just as much a violation of the compact as if
the right itself was directly destroyed. Bronson vs. Kinzie, et al.
1 How. 316. "The objection to a law on the ground of its impairing the obligation of a contract can never depend upon the extent
of the change which the law effects in it. Any deviation from its
terms, by postponing, or accelerating the period of performance
which it prescribes, imposing conditions not expressed in the contract, or dispensing with the performance of those which are, however minute, or apparently immaterial, in their effect upon the contract of the parties, impairs its obligation." Green vs. Biddle,.8
Wheaton, 1. A contract of mortgage vests an interest; and its
main incident is a right to have the land applied in discharge of the
debt, either in the way prescribed by the law when the contract was
made, or in some form of remedy substantially equal. Gantly's
Lessee vs. Ewing, 8 How. 707.
These principles have been applied to govern the contracts and control the acts of States, clothed with all the powers and prerogatives of
sovereignty. We see no reason why a municipal corporation, which
may be created and destroyed by the State at pleasure, should stand
upon higher or better footing than its own creator. Like a State, it
has its public duties and its private rights. It has no right to enter into a contract which interferes with its duties to preserve the health
and morals of the city. It may therefore defeat the title of its own
grantee when it becomes necessary to do so in order to abate a nuisance or preserve the public health. The Presbyterian C7urcb vs.
City of NVew York, 5 Hill, 540, and Stuyvesant vs. TIe Mayor of
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rew Y rk, 6 Hill, 603, are instances of the exercise of this right;
and it rests upon the ground that a corporation, acting for the benefit
of others, has no power to enter into a contract which would prevent it
from performing its public duties. Every right derived from it is
holden subject to the restriction that it shall be so exercised as.not
to injure others. Upon this principle, if the gas works should
become a nuisance, affecting the health and comfort of the neighborhood, the city councils, notwithstanding their own lease of the
ground, would have the right to direct the removal of the works to
a place where they would be less injurious to the public. The Master of the Rolls, in speaking of the East India Company, admitted
that it had rights as a sovereign power, but declared that it had
also duties as an individual; and notwithstanding its claim to the
right of violating its contract, as an incident to its character as a
sovereign power, it was held to be bound by its contracts as a private company. Moodalay,vs. Morton, I Br. Ch. Cas. 471.
The restrictio-n upon the power of a municipal corporation to enter
into contracts, which mby prevent it from performing its duty to the
public, is'nothing more than the application of the familiar principle which avoids the contracts of individuals when they are detrimental to the public rights. 'But the contracts which a municipal
corporation may make for the purpose of supplying the inhabitants
with gas light in theit streets and houses, relate to the "things of
commerce" as distinguished in the civil law from the "things public," which are regulated by the sovereign. Such contracts are not
made by virtue of its powers of local sovereignty, but in its capacity
of a private corporation. The supply of gas light is no more a duty
of sovereignty than the supply of water. Both these objects may
be accomplished through the agency of individuals or private corporations, and in very many instances they are accomplished by those
means. If this power is granted to a borough or city, it is a special private franchise, made as well for the private emolument and
advantage of the city as for the public good. The whole investment is the private property of the city, as much so as the lands
and houses belonging to it. Blending the two powers in one grant
does not destroy the clear and well settled distinction, and the pro-
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cess of separation is not rendered impossible by the eonfusion. In
separating them, regard must be had to the object of the legislature in conferring them. If granted for public purposes exclusively,
they belong to the corporate body in its public, political or municipal character. But if the grant was for purposes of private advantage and emolument, though the public may derive a common
benefit therefrom, the corporation, quo ad hwc, is to be regarded as
a private company. It stands on the same footing as would any
individual or body of persons where the like special franchise had
been conferred. These principles are well enforced by Chief Justice Nelson, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of New
York, in the case of Bailey vs. The City of .lew York, 3 Hill,
588. In that case the acts of the city had relation to the construction of water works. In this they have relation to gas works. But
the principle is precisely the same in both cases.
By the contract with the loanholders, the city has placed the
works and their income in the hands of trustees as a security for
the loans. The loans subsequent to that act were contracted on the
faith of that pledge. The city has no more right to disturb the
security than a mortgager would have to demand a re-conveyance
without payment of the mortgage debt. To say that the city does
not mean to disturb the security, is nothing to the purpose. The
contract designates the manner in which the trustees are to be appointed. By that system they are placed on a permanent footing,
and are effectually guarded against the changes and consequent
mismanagement which might flow from the impulsive action of
political parties. This arrangement was a -verymaterial consideration with those who advanced their money on the faith of it, and
the city has no right to change the trustees in any other mode than
that prescribed by the compact. A debtor who has made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors has no right to reclaim the property assigned, without payment of his debts; nor has he any right
to substitute himself as a trustee for his creditors against their will.
This is the rule even in the case of voluntary assignments; but it
applies with much greater force to assignments or pledges of property to secure the payment of debts contracted on the faith of
them.
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The act of 2d February, 1854, gives the city no new rights whatever over these works. It merely transfers to the corporation as
enlarged, the rights which the same corporation possessed before
the enlargement of its boundaries; and the rights thus transferred
are subject to the " trusts, limitations and conditions," which existed before. As owner of the works, subject to the paramount
rights of the loanholders, the city may inspect the books, accounts
and papers relating to them, and demand an accurate account of
the proceedings of the trustees. If she has reason to believe that
they are mismanaging the trust to such an extent that her own
power of removal, as regulated by the contract, would be an inadequate remedy, she may, like other cestui que trusts, apply to the
courts of justice for redress. If she thinks that by a more economical management than tha theretofore practiced the price of gas
might be reduced without violating the provisions of the contract
with the loanholders, she may file a bill for an account and ask for
the directions of the court on the question. In the mean time she
has'no power to withdraw any portion of the income of the works
from the trust fund. She has no better right to do it indirectly by
withholding the payment of any just debt she may owe for gas,
than she has to accomplish the same object by a direct seizure of
the works and their rev'rnues. These rights and duties may very
appropriately be assigned to the "gas department," authorized by
section fifty of the Consolidation Act. Whatever powers may be
exercised over the gas works of the other incorporated districts now
included within the city limits, it is clear that none exists over those
in question in this case, except in subordination to the rights of the
loanholders as defined by the ordinance of 17th June, 1841. If
those rights have been subsequently modified by consent, such
modification furnishes no ground for any further deviation from
original contract without consent.
The exigency of the case calls for nothing more at present than
an injunction to restrain the city of Philadelphia from attempting
to take possession of the gas works described in the bill, or to interfere with the trustees therein named, in their control and manage-
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ment of the said works, and the incomes and other funds belonging
to the same, until the further order of this court. Let an injunction for that purpose issue upon filing a bond with security in
twenty thousand dollars, pursuant to the statute in such case
provided.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.-tarchTerm, 1852.
BENJAMIN S. MULFORD, APPELLANT, and JONATHAN BOWEN AND OTHERS,
RESPONDENTS.'

1. The rule that an executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, cannot directly
or indirectly become a purchaser at his own sale, is firmly established.
2. It is uniformly held in courts of equity, that the trustee will not be permitted to
derive benefit from a purchase thus made, but that the deed Will be avoided at
the instance of the cestui que trist.
3. It has been held in this State, not only that the deed may be avoided in equity,
but that as against the cestui ge trust it will be treated as void in a court of law.
The rule at law, however, is not that the deed is absolutely void; the extent of the
doctrine is that the cestui ge trust may avail himself of the objection at law.
4. Admitting the doctrine of the courts of law in its fullest extent, the trustee, in
case the deed be avoided, may be entitled to equitable relief. And the equities
subsisting between the trustee and cestuigue trust cannot depend upon the tribunal in which relief is sought.

The equities of the trustee cannot be defeated by
the cestui qe trust resorting to law rather than equity, for relief.
5. Where the cause was retained for the purpose of final relief in equity, and nothing could be gained by permitting the party to proceed with his action at law,
the injunction was continued.

On the twentieth of February, eighteen hundred and thirty-seven,
the appellant and John S. Mulford, administrators of Mason Mulford, deceased, made sale of part of the real estate of their intestate, for the payment of the debts of the estate, by virtue of an
1 Stockton's N. J. R. 797.

Reported in the court below, 4 Halst. Ch. 751.
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order of the Orphans' court of the county of Cumberland. At the
vendue, the land was struck off to one Isaac Mulford, he being the
highest bidder, for the sum of eighteen hundred dollars. On the
first of March, eighteen hundred and thirty-seven, a deed was made
by the administrators, pursuant to the sale, to Isaac Mulford. On
the same day and for the same consideration, he re-conveyed the
land to the complainant.
At the July term, eighteen hundred and forty-seven, two of the
heirs at law of Mason Mulford, the intestate, ifistituted an action of
ejectment against the complainant for the recovery of their share
of the real estate thus sold and conveyed. The complainant thereupon filed his bill in equity against the plaintiffs in the action of
ejectment, praying that they might be restrained by injunction from
further proceeding at law, and be decreed to confirm the title of the
complainant to the said real estate ; or if the chancellor should be of
opinion that the title of the complainant was voidable in equity, that
they might come to an equitable account; that the complainant
might have a lien upon the real estate for the amount of the purchase money and of all permanent improvements made by him upon
real estate, over and above the rents and profits.
An injunction issued pursuant to the prayer of the bill. Upon the
hearing, the injunction was dissolved, but the bill was retained, no
final decree having been made upon the merits. From the order of
the chancellor, dissolving the injunction, the complainant appealed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GREEN, 0. J.-The well settled rule in equity, that an executor,
administrator, guardian, or trustee, cannot directly or indirectly become a purchaser at his own sale, has not been called in question.
The rule is firmly established. It rests upon clear principles. It
is dictated by obvious considerations of policy. It is essential to
guard at once the trustee from temptation, and the cestui que trust
from the consequences of fraud and injustice. It is uniformly held
in courts of equity that the trustee will not be permitted to derive
benefit from a purchase thus made, but that the deed will be avoided
at the instance of the cestui que trusts. In this State it has been
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held not only that the deed may be avoided in equity, but that as
against the cestui que trust it will be treated as void in-a court of
law. "The doctrine obtains not only where the trustee has been
guilty of actual fraud, but also in cases of construction or equitable
fraud resulting from the mere purchase by the trustee of the estate
of the cestui que trust, without regard to the bonafides or mala
fides of the transaction.
It was earnestly insisted upon in argument, on the part of the
appellant, that the rule at law, as adopted in this State, is inconsistent, not only with the practice of courts of law elsewhere, but with
sound principle. If it were so, it would not be in accordance with
the practice of a court of equity, in administering relief, to proceed
upon the ground that a legal principle, long established in courts of
law, was erroneous; nor could such a conclusion be of any avail to
the appellant in this cause. He seeks relief in equity upon the
very ground that at law his deed will be avoided. This constitutes
in fact the equity of his bill. Without it his relief would be complete at law, and he would have no standing in a court of equity.
This bill must necessarily be dismissed.
Nor is it designed to intimate an opinion, that sitting even as a
court of common law this court would be disposed to unsettle the
rule that a deed made by an executor or trustee directly or indirectly to himself, may be avoided at law as well as in equity. No
inconvenience has arisen, nor is it perceived that any will necessarily result from the practice. Sound policy requires that not the
slightest encouragement should be given to the practice of trustees
dealing in the estates of their eestui que trusts.
The rule at law, however, is not that the deed is absolutely void.
Such expressions have no doubt been used by courts, but clearly
without regard to critical accuracy. The extent of the doctrine is,
that the cestui que trust may avail himself of the objection at law,
and is not necessarily driven to equity for relief. The deed is not
absolutely void. It is good unless the cestui que trust elect to
avoid it.
Admitting the doctrine of the courts of law in its fullest extent,
the trustee, in case the deed be avoided, may be entitled to equi-
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table relief. It is true that a court of law cannot adjust equities
and administer relief upon equitable principles, but for that very
reason the doors of a court of equity ought not to be barred against
him. Courts of law never have decided that the trustee should lose
the land and the purchase money also ; that the cestui que trust
should recover the land and retain the price paid for it. They have
simply avoided the purchase, and left the parties to resort to equity
for relief; any other doctrine would convert a rule designed for the
suppression of fraud into an instrument of fraud. In case, then,
the cestici que trusts attempt at law to recover the estate purchased
by the trustee, he may come into equity for relief. Whether he be
or be not entitled to relief, will necessarily depend upon the character and circumstances of the transaction.
Nor is the relief sought by the complainant obnoxious to the objection urged by the respondent that a court of equity will never
relieve v party against his own fraudulent act. The complainant
is not seeking to avoid his contract, or asking to be protected
against its consequences. The cestui que trusts seek in a court of
law to avoid the contract, and recover the premises conveyed to the
trustee, He asks that they Miay be restrained from recovering the
possession of the premises, until they repay the money actually
advanced, and the equities between them be adjusted. In other
words, he asks the relief to which he would clearly have been entitled had the cestui que trusts sought to avoid the deed in equity,
and not at law. Nothing can be clearer than that the equities subsisting between the trustee and the cestui que trust cannot depend
upon the tribunal in which relief is sought, and that the equity of
the trustee should not be defeated by the cestui que trusts resorting
to law rather than equity for relief. Though a court of law be incompetent to administer relief, the arm of a court of equity is not
thereby shortened.
If the cause is retained for the purpose of final relief in equity,
nothing can be gained by permitting the party to proceed with the
action at law. The question of actual fraud cannot be tried in that
suit. The jury will be instructed, in case it appear that the administrator was a purchaser at his own sale, whether he be guilty of
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actual fraud or not, that their verdict must be for the plaintiff. The
proper mode of taking the verdict of a jury upon the question of
actual fraud, if that be desirable, would be by an issue at law. The
injunction, therefore should be continued till the cause is finally settled in equity.
No opinion can now with propriety be expressed upon the merits
of the case. The appeal is solely from that part of the decree dissolving the injunction. From the residue of the decree there is no
appeal. Indeed the merits of the case do not appear to have been
at all considered-certainly not decided upon by the chancellor.
This court, therefore, cannot decide upon them.
The necessary parties, moreover, are not before the court, to warrant a final decree. Only two of the heirs are made parties to the
bill.
The order dissolving the injunction must be reversed, the injunction continued till the further order of the court, and the cause remitted to the court of chancery to be proceeded in according to the
rules and practice of that court.
Decree accordingly.

Court of Errors and Apveals of .New Jersey].-June Term, 1852.
THE EXECUTORS Or JOHN P. QUICK, APPELLANTS,

and ELIZABETH

FISHER

ET AL., RESPONDENTS.'
1. As a general principle, a trustee has no power to change the character of the trust
fund ; and if he assume the power of converting real estate into personal, or personal into real, he acts at his peril.
2. If a change in the character of the fund be deemed necessary, or for the interest
ofthe beneficiary, it should be made only with the permission and by the sanction of a court of equity.
8. The rule applies not only to executors, administrators, guardians of infants and

lunatics, and other trustees specially constituted by law, but to all trustees
having charge of the property of others.
1 Stockton's Rep. 802.

appeal, 4 Halst. 778.

The case in Chancery is reported in 4 Halst. 674; and on
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3. And if a loss has been sustained, from the trustee exceeding his authority by an
unauthorized and illegal disposition of the trust funds in his hands, he isliable for
the loss.

The opinion of the .court was delivered by
GREEN, C. J.-Peter Prall, by his last will and testament, gave
and bequeathed the one-fourth part of the residue of his personal
estate to his son-in-law, John P. Quick, in trust, nevertheless, for
the use, benefit, and support of his grand-daughter, Mary Fisher,
to be paid to her, the said Mary Fisher, by the said John P. Quick,
as her necessities may require. Prior to the first of May, 1830,
John P. Quick, the trustee, received the trust funds so bequeathed
to him, amounting to two thousand one hundred eighty-six dollars.
Of this sum, eighty-six dollars appears to have been paid to the cestui que trust, as it was received on the first of May, 1830. The
balance of the fund, two thousand one hundred dollars, was invested
in the purchase of real estate, by reason of which a large part of
the trust fund is alleged to have been lost. On the sixth of February, 1885, Mary Fisher, the cestui que trust, died, leaving six children. After the death of Mary Fisher, the real estate was sold and
the trustee prepared an account of the trust fund, exhibiting the
loss alleged to have been sustained by the investment. In accordance with this statement, a settlement was made by the trustee with
four of the children of Mary Fisher; their respective shares of the
alleged balance was paid to them, and their receipt taken for the
amount so paid respectively. On the twenty-ninth day of December, 1845, the trustee died, the complainants, two of the children of
the said Mary Fisher, then being under twenty-one years of age.
The bill is filed by two of the children of Mary Fisher, who were
under age at the death of John P. Quick, the trustee, to recover
against his executors their share of the trust fund.
It is admitted that the defendants are boupd to account. The
only question is upon what principle the account should be stated.
The trust fund consisted of money which was invested by the trustee in the purchase of real estate. The complainants claim the full
amount of the fund with interest, deducting only such payments as

QUICK'S EXECUTORS vs. FISHER ET AL.

have been made to the beneficiary, or for her benefit. The defendants claim an allowance for losses sustained by reason of the investment of the fund in real estate.
I deem it clear, both from the answer and from the evidence, that
the trust fund was in point of fact invested in the purchase of real
estate. There is no reason to doubt that the investment was made
in good faith for the benefit of the beneficiary. She was the daughter of the trustee. She was the wife of a man incapable or indisposed to maintain his family. She was, moreover, the mother of a
family of dependent children. The father may well have supposed,
under such circumstances, that a fund specially designed for the
benefit and support of his daughter would be best invested in providing a home for her and for her children. The investment was
made (if not at the instance of the daughter herself) certainly at
the solicitation of her husband and of his friends. The trustee had
no personal interest in making the investment, nor so far as it appears, did he derive the least pecuniary advantage from it. On the
contrary, he added to the trust fund a considerable amount of his
own money in order to make the purchase and put the property in
repair. The beneficiary and her children were put in possession
immediately on the completion of the purchase, and they were permitted to continue in the possession and enjoyment of the property
so long as the husband of the beneficiary was able to carry on his
business, and immediately upon the death of the cestui que trust
the property was sold at a sacrifice. He took the deed for the property, it is true, in his own name and not as trustee, but this he
may have done either because he supposed, as appears by the evidence, that he had himself an eventual interest in the trust fund, or
because a part of his own property was invested in the purchase, or
because he supposed he might thus most effectually control the property as well for the interest of the beneficiary as for his own. I
see nothing in the transaction to impugn in the least degree the
character of the trustee for integrity, however much he may have
erred in judgment or in the estimate of his legal rights. It appears,
moreover, that every dollar of the trust fund received by the trustee prior to the determination to purchase the real estate was paid
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over as soon as received to the beneficiary, and that the whole balance of the fund, with a large sum of the trustee's individual property, was invested in the purchase of the real estate of which, as
has already been said, the beneficiary and her family for years enjoyed the entire benefit. I deem this statement due in justice to the
memory of the trustee, and especially as the account which was prepared by him years after the death of his daughter, has received,
and perhaps justly admits of, a harsh interpretation, affecting, to
say the least, the liberality of the accountant. In considering the
case, it may be fairly assumed not only that in point of fact the truit
money was invested in the purchase of real estate, but that the investment was made in good faith and from justifiable motives. The
question remains, had the trustee the right to make such investment of the trust fund? And if he had not, then in equity, must
the loss be borne by his estate or by the trust fund ?
It is admitted as a general principle, that the trustee has no
power to change the character of the trust fund, and that if he assume the power of converting real estate into personal, or personal
into real, he acts at his peril.
While he will be suffered to derive no benefit from such change of
investment, he will be held personally accountable for any loss which
may ensue. While the beneficiary will be permitted, if it appear
for his interest to follow the fund, through whatever changes it may
pass, the trustee will not be permitted to compel the beneficiary to
accept the property after the conversion, or to impose any loss
which may result from the conversion upon the trust fund.
If a change in the character of the fund be deemed necessary, or
for the interest of the beneficiary, it should be made only with the
permission and by the sanction of a court of equity. The rule applies not only to executors, administrators, guardians of infants and
lunatics, and other trustees specially constituted by law, but to all
bare trustees, having charge of the property of others, and not specially invested with peculiar or extraordinary powers. Experience
has shown that the rule is a wise and salutary one. The security
of the fund is a primary consideration in the investment of the trust
estate. The temptations to a trustee to tamper with a trust fund
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are so numerous and so powerful, the hopes of bettering the estate
so often prove delusive, that the power of changing the character of
the fund is most safely reposed in the discretion of judicial tribunals.
Nor is the rule prohibiting the change of character of the trust
fund founded solely or mainly upon the consideration that the inheritance or succession to the estate is thereby affected. On the
contrary, it is a well settled rule in equity, that the character of
the fund will be converted from personal to real or from real to personal without regard to the succession whenever the interests of the
beneficiary require it. Matter of Salisbury, 3 J. 0. R., 347.
The trustee, if the principle be correctly stated, has in this case
exceeded his authority. The loss has been sustained not by an error of judgment committed by the trustee in the management of the
trust fund, but by an illegal and unauthorized disposition of the trust
funds in his hands. He is consequently liable for the loss.
It cannot be objected that these complainants have slumbered
over their rights, or that they designedly forebore to prosecute their
claim till after the death of the trustee. They were both infants at
the death of the trustee, and consequently were not chargeable
with laches.
Nor can it be objected that they have in any
wise assented to the illegal disposition of trust fund, or ratified directly or indirectly the act of the trustee. Whatever force there
may be in these objections as applied to the other children of Mary
Fisher, it does not apply to these complainants.
As to the objection that the husband of Mary Fisher, as her administrator, and not her children, is entitled to this fund, and that
therefore the children are in no contingency entitled to recover, it
is enough to answer, if there be anything in the objection, that it is
not a ground of appeal in the present case, and that the objection
may be raised upon the final hearing in equity.
The decree should be affirmed.

